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Three human rights myths serve to limit the debate over 
human rights in the United States and bias our perspective 
in dealing with the human rights claims of citizens from 
other countries. The first myth is that human rights belong 
solely to individuals and protect them largely from nega­
tive actions by the state. The second myth declares that 
civil and political rights are primary while economic, 
cultural, and social rights are secondary. The third myth 
asserts that the only rights that count are legal in nature 
and that moral or personal claims are invalid or irrelevant. 
Even a brief historical analysis reveals that all three myths 
are just that-myths. The group rights of corporations are 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti­
tution, economic rights have been upheld over political 
claims as witness the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision, 
and legal debates over rights have often obscured the 
political, personal, and identity questions that many rights 
arguments revolve around. Only a conception of human 
rights that views them as the gradual empowerment of 
people or groups or the deconcentration of power removes 
them from the realm of an elite debate among experts and 
allows for cross-cultural comparison and action. 
The last 2S years have given rise to an explosion of human rights 
demands. These demands, in turn, have produced many new laws, 
organizations, and a library of scholarly works on human rights .  In 
fact, one author refers to a new "human rights industry" that has 
sprung up. Belatedly, human rights education has emerged in the 
school curriculum far beyond its usual place as a "current event" or 
as an "Enlightenment idea. "  However, in moving to a more central 
place, human rights has created as much confusion as clarity. Who 
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are all of these special interests and how do we adjudicate between 
their competing demands? What is the relationship between rights 
and freedoms? Is there a clear-cut answer to the "hate speech" 
debate? Have demands such as affirmative action some how gotten 
away from the more "basic" rights embedded in our Constitution? 
In a truly multicultural country and world, we must begin to clear 
away some of the confusion surrounding human rights in the United 
States and create a foundation on which we might build a more 
coherent and equitable conception of human rights. To do this, we 
must challenge the traditional conception of human rights embraced 
by the United States government and many scholars and activists in 
this country. This traditional view of human rights rests on at least 
three myths. First, it sees rights only as individual claims against state 
power. There are no rights between the state and groups even though 
the United States may be the most group-oriented society in the 
world. Second, partly as a result of history and partly as a result of 
superpower politiCS, human rights in the US has come to mean 
political and civil rights rather than economic and cultural rights .  
The rise of "third world" claims and the deconstruction of the Soviet 
Union have made this narrow view of rights increaSingly untenable. 
Third, rights in the US tend to be seen as legal rather than moral or 
political . That is, if one does not have recourse to legal action then 
one is seen as not having a right in reality. This legal framework 
extends to the international arena where all rights are seen as flowing 
from the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
however, there is no acknowledged framework for prioritizing these 
delineated rights. 
The traditional way we view these rights in the United States 
ignores the fact that this country has never been culturally or 
religiously homogeneous and that its diversity has increased dramati­
cally over the last century. The United States was first a multicultural 
nation through conquest and then enslavement followed by immi­
gration.  Given this history, I believe that the phrase "human rights" 
is best defined as the newly articulated demands for empowering 
people who (because of poverty or discrimination) have suffered 
deprivation or oppression. In a power theory of human rights, 
demands (or claims) are made by persons, individually or in associa­
tion with others, to get or keep the power to satisfy felt or perceived 
needs. Frederick Douglass was asserting such a theory over 100 years 
ago when he said: "Let me give you a word of the philosophy of 
reform. The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows 
that all concessions yet made to her august claims, have been born of 
earnest struggle . . . .  Power concedes nothing without a demand. It 
never did and it never will. " I Power (or control) is simply the ability 
to help cause effects . It is much more than might, or physical force. 
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Love, religion, philosophy and law may all be sources of power. Their 
use combines with other causal factors to produce unintended 
consequences and by-products. Their legitimacy depends on the 
depth and breadth of acceptance either through passive consent or 
active support.2 
The first myth, that rights obtain only to the relationship between 
the individual and the state, helps delegitimize group-based claims. 
This traditional individualistic view of rights is ironic given that the 
development of the UN Declaration of Human Rights was grounded 
in response to the oppression of a group Oews) by another group 
(Aryans) . Without going into the enormous economic and cultural 
differences within the US or between the US and any other country, 
we must recognize that all humans are first and foremost individuals­
in-groups.  From birth onward, they are social animals. The "self" is 
linked first with the mother and then with other "others. "  lt is 
influenced not only by heredity and the physical environment but 
also by a cultural environment. Individual dignity and worth are 
defined largely by multiple social roles and affiliation, that is, by 
belonging to one or more communities of shared interests-a family, 
household, gang, neighborhood, association, formal organization, 
religion, ethnic or national group or even by identifying with a 
uniform, flag, athletic team or media celebrity. The "rat race" in 
corporate bureaucracies, as pointed out decades ago in The Organiza­
tion Man, takes place in a collectivist cage.3 The long-term impact of 
Soviet totalitarianism was the impairment of " a citizen's ability to act 
constructively and cooperatively with fellow citizens. "  As a Soviet 
official explained it to Richard Schifter: "I spoke freely to my wife and 
she spoke freely to me. We did not share our thoughts with any one 
else ."4 
An examination of the diplomatiC history between Native Ameri­
can peoples and the US government would certainly seem to support 
the argument that the rights of individuals reign supreme. How else 
do we explain the nearly 500 broken treaties with American Indian 
tribes? What motivates government policy to break-up tribes? How 
can the sovereignty of tribal nations be ignored in legal and moral 
terms? What role does race play in the group-centered demands of 
Native Americans and African Americans? Are cultural or biological 
definitions of race more persuasive in making rights claims? Indeed, 
claims such as affirmative action and reparations make no sense 
unless we recognize that government policy did recognize groups 
rewarding some and punishing others. Perhaps the best example of 
the legal recognition of groups is the corporation Moreover, the 
recognition of the corporation as a "legal person" bestowed upon 
them economic benefits that were often given priority over the 
political and civil claims of individuals. 
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The legislative history of the post-Civil War Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution reveals that two members of the committee 
that drafted the amendment, Representatives John Bingham and 
Roscoe Conkling, a prominent Republican and successful railroad 
lawyer, explained that they added the word "person" (in addition to 
"citizen") not to help former slaves but to help protect "joint stock 
companies" from the oppression of state or local regulation, expro­
priation, and "invidious and discriminating" taxes.  Under a flood of 
judicial decisions, the "fictive personality" of state-chartered corpo­
rations became one of the fundaments under the towering structure 
of corporate law.s Every corporation was thus entitled to all the 
rights, including due process, at all levels of government, that the 
constitution granted to mortals. Despite occasional dissents, these 
rights have long been upheld. 
With this due process protection against state government regu­
lation and with massive government aid to corporate collectivities 
through land grants, protective tariffs and other subsidies, Northern 
industry expanded rapidly and the US began to emerge as a potential 
Great Power. All this took place under the ideological umbrella of a 
weak central government. For decades the Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional many laws that limited the rights of large corpora­
tions or, as Arthur Schlesinger puts it, to "counter the aggreSSions of 
local majorities on the rights of minorities and individuals . "6 More 
recently, the US has insisted that the right to private property be a part 
of international human rights instruments. 
The second human rights myth in the United States is that political 
and civil rights should be given priority over economic and cultural 
rights. This myth prevails even though the right to private property 
(which runs counter to the conceptions of land ownership held by 
the original inhabitants of this country) is certainly an economic 
right. A recent example of the priority attached to this position 
comes from the introduction to the State Department's Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990 by Richard Schifter: 
In applying these internationally recognized stan­
dards, we seek to be objective. But the reports 
unashamedly reflect the U.S. view that government 
is legitimate only when grounded on the consent of 
the governed, and that government thus grounded 
should not be used to deny life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness . . . .  We have found that the 
concept of economic, social, and cultural rights is 
often confused, sometimes willfully, by repressive 
governments claiming that, in order to promote 
these "rights, " they may deny their citizens the rights 
to integrity of the person as well as political and civil 
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rights. If these basic rights are not secured, experi-
ence has shown, the goals of economic development 
are not reached either . . . .  From this premise, that 
basic human rights may not be abridged or denied, it 
follows that our human rights policy is concerned 
with the limitations on the powers of government 
that are required to protect the integrity and dignity 
of the individuaL7 
It is certainly true that US human rights policy has been concerned 
with limiting the powers of government. However, it is a myth that 
this policy placed individual political and civil rights first. Perhaps 
the greatest challenge to this myth occurred in 1857  in the Dred Scott 
decision of the US Supreme Court. Dred Scott, a slave, had been taken 
by his master to live in Illinois, a free state, and later in the Louisiana 
territory north of 36° 30' in which slavery had been prohibited by the 
Missouri Compromise of 1 820. After his return to Missouri, Scott 
sued in Federal Court to obtain his freedom on the ground that he had 
resided in "free territory" and was thus entitled to his freedom (citing 
English common law) . In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that 
historically blacks "had no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect" and therefore blacks had been denied citizenship.8 Thus, 
Dred Scott lacked " legal standing" before the courts. However, the 
Supreme Court went beyond denying Scott citizenship rights to 
assert that congress had no authority to deprive a citizen "from 
holding and owning property of this kind [slaves] in the territory 
mentioned in the Compromise or in any place in the United States . "9 
In Dred Scott the civil and political rights of blacks in even free states 
was submerged beneath the economic rights of slave masters to own 
human property. 
The debate over the Dred Scott decision illustrates the final myth 
about human rights-that they are natural or " God-given. "  Aside from 
the theological questions this view raises, it also tends to obscure the 
political context of rights. A top-down view of rights that sees them 
only as a struggle between the individual and the state artificially 
separates the public sphere from the private. Every right involves a 
political and social struggle and these struggles by individuals and 
groups to control their lives are more than simple protection from the 
power of a monarch or a centralized government. It is the power of 
women and children to gain some control over their lives in the 
family as well as the right of a union to organize. While court 
decisions or UN Conventions may help legitimate certain rights 
claims, governments cannot guarantee rights. Only the actual 
struggle over responsibilities and remedies will determine which 
among competing claims are met. In this struggle, moral and 
political norms provide the framework in which legal decisions are 
made and legislation is passed. 
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Only by understanding the political context of the human struggle 
can one explain the failure of the United States to ratify the basic 
human rights instruments. Throughout the 1 950s and 1960s a 
common theme of the opposition involved the fear that interna­
tional pressure would force the granting of political and civil rights 
to national minorities in this country. Thus, the president of the 
American Bar Association, Frank Holman, could state the following: 
"I pointed out that if, in driving me from the airport, [someone] had 
unfortunately run over a Negro child running out into the street in 
front of him, what would have been a local offense under a charge of 
gross negligence or involuntary manslaughter would, under the 
Genocide Convention, because of the racial differential, not be a local 
crime but an international crime and that [he] could be transported 
someplace overseas for trial. " 10 The long-term success of the forces 
opposed to ratification of the UN conventions and covenants in the 
US is at least in part measured by their success in framing the debate 
over human rights treaties in legal rather than moral terms. 
This formalistic approach to rights is complemented by our as­
sumption that rights are public rather than private. Such a distinc­
tion is evident when we label violence that occurs in the home 
"domestic" and thus attach less severe or no penalties to those who 
perpetrate such acts. The modern women's movement has done 
much to break down the barriers between the personal and the 
political . Yet many of these activists are often drawn into abstract 
debates on rights rather than the substance of specific demands for 
empowerment. In the case of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), for 
example, the anti-ERA forces mobilized their constituents far more 
effectively than did their opponents around the politicizing of 
personal issues. The ERA's abstract nature and indeterminate lan­
guage lacked the impulse of an urgent issue and left the door open for 
distorted claims about possible future interpretations by the Supreme 
Court. 1 1  However, that is not to say that the campaign for ratification 
was without positive education effects for women and men. 
The tendency for the human rights struggles to get caught up in 
abstract, legalistic arguments hides the moral bases of law which are 
essential to building mass movements. Martin Luther King's great 
appeal was as a moral leader and not as a legal scholar or legislator. 
His appeal to higher "natural law" as reflected in the "Letter from 
Birmingham Jail" represents the most eloquent statement of the 
spirit of the civil rights movement. 12 
Yet this appeal to higher law can work both ways as evidenced by 
the wide-spread disrespect for law and order in the South following 
the Brown decision in 1954.  At the same time, there exists in 
American legal culture a quite different tendency: a desire to regulate 
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human behavior tyrannically by means of formal laws. Over fifty 
years ago, Gunnar Myrdal cited this tendency as a remnant of early 
American Puritanism which was sometimes fanatical and dogmatic 
and always had a strong inclination to mind other people's business. 
Thus, according to Myrdal, " [t]o demand and legislate all sorts of laws 
against this or that is just as much a part of American freedom as to 
disobey the laws when they are enacted. " "America, " he says, "has 
become a country where exceedingly much is permitted in practice 
but at the same time exceedingly much is forbidden in law. " 13 
Myrdal's discussion of these conflicting tendencies in American 
law helps explain why Americans have come to place so much 
emphasis on "the letter of the law" as opposed to its spiri t . I4 How else 
can we explain why the federal government is forced to carry out 
important social legislation like the 1 964 Civil Rights Act under the 
fiction that it is regulating "interstate commerce, " or that federal 
prosecuting agencies punish dangerous gangsters for income tax 
evasion rather than for the felonies they have committed. 
Myrdal contends that Americans now have a judicial order that 
runs counter to their basic idealistic inclinations. The American 
creed as Myrdal delineated it in An American Dilemma included 
liberty, equality, individualism, democracy and rule of law under a 
constitution. More recently, Samuel Huntington has argued that this 
American Creed forms the basis for our national identity which is 
political rather than cultural . In a country as heterogeneous as the 
United States it is not surprising that our identity would flow from 
political ideals rather than cultural reality. 
This peculiar political identity, however, has a number of conse­
quences.  American identity, for example, is defined in normative 
terms, French identity in existential terms. French political behavior, 
in this sense, is whatever the French in fact do in politics; American 
political behavior, on the other hand, is what American political 
ideals say Americans ought to do in politics. This external standard by 
which to judge the legitimacy of American political practice and 
institutions provides a basis to challenge the status quo. IS 
Of course, the problem with the American Creed as a standard of 
evaluation is that it contains conflicting values. It is not a systematic 
ideology in the European sense. There is no theory for ordering these 
values or resolving conflict among them. Hence, we are back to our 
original questions. Whose rights do we uphold-those who wish to 
engage in free speech or those who wish to be protected from hate and 
intimidation? In fact, as our three myths demonstrate, power is the 
instrument used to resolve conflict. 
The political character of our national identity helps explain 
much of our bias in approaching international human rights. We 
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tend to distrust authority, promote individual liberty and political 
rights over economic equality and group rights. Yet, as we have seen, 
our idealism has often masked a practice that promotes the rights, 
including economic rights, of some groups over others . Our ten­
dency to engage in extended legal debates over " the letter of the law" 
.a1so hides the moral basis of our actions and removes them from the 
realm of popular discourse. 
Many rights are "universal" ideals in the sense of being widely 
accepted by elites in the world community, although violated in 
practice and unknown to most people in the world. By focusing on 
human rights as the gradual empowerment of people or the 
deconcentration of power, we move away from the conception of 
rights that views them as a public contract between the individual 
and the state rather than the private relationships within families or 
between groups .  In the words of Nobel Laureate Ralph Bunche during 
World War II: "As members of a disadvantaged minority in this 
society, we must recognize clearly that we are forced to fight on two 
fronts. We must struggle to win our share of the blessings of life in a 
democratic society and we must join with the rest of the nation in a 
whole-hearted fight to preserve the democratic framework and ideals 
of this society. It is only when the latter fight is won that the former 
can ever again have real meaning." 16 
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